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Abstract 
In 2015–16 Germany was confronted with over 1 million new 
refugees, which challenged public and private institutions 
alike and increasingly divided public sentiments. This arti-
cle investigates the cultural, political, and economic dynam-
ics as they were in Germany in 2015–16 and in particular 
how its higher education sector responded. The discussion 
covers a comprehensive review of media debates, public and 
private institutional research, new German- and English-
language scholarship, and case studies the authors collected 
of fifteen universities. The article ends with recommenda-
tions as German universities prepare for 30,000–50,000 
refugees eligible for study in the coming years.
Résumé
En 2015-2016, l’Allemagne a fait face à plus de 1 million de 
nouveaux réfugiés, ce qui a remis en question les institutions 
publiques et privées et généré des sentiments de plus en plus 
divisés de la part du public. Cet article explore les dynam-
iques économiques, politiques et culturelles telles qu’elles se 
présentaient en Allemagne ces années-là, et en particulier 
la réaction de son enseignement supérieur. La discussion 
porte sur un examen exhaustif des débats médiatiques, de la 
recherche institutionnelle publique et privée, des nouvelles 
bourses d’études pour apprendre l’allemand ou l’anglais, et 
d’études de cas colligées par les auteurs dans 15 universités. 
L’article se termine sur des recommandations, alors que les 
universités allemandes se préparent à accueillir de 30 000 
à 50 000 réfugiés admissibles aux études dans les années à 
venir.
Introduction
The ongoing Syrian civil war has been a tragedy of his-toric proportions. Over 250,000 Syrians died during its first five years, 6 million became internally displaced, 
and over 4 million were rendered stateless throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), or sought safe havens 
in Europe, the United States, but mostly in neighbouring 
countries (e.g., Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon). Much of the 
rest of the Arab world remains in turmoil, with tribal war-
fare and terror groups in countries where dictatorships were 
overthrown during the Arab Spring and simmering or boil-
ing conflicts persist.1 
This upheaval has intensified the migration of refugees 
and asylum seekers in many directions, including toward 
Europe.2 
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This article shares a study of the cultural, political, and 
economic dynamics that played out in Germany in 2015–16 
in response to the influx of refugees that came into the coun-
try in only a matter of months. In particular, we focus on 
how the German higher education sector responded. We 
begin with a comprehensive review of media debates, public 
and private institutional research, and new German- and 
English-language scholarship that was just emerging at the 
time, and triangulate that with case studies we conducted of 
fifteen diverse universities throughout the country as well 
as findings from other studies emerging at the same time. 
The article concludes with recommendations for German 
universities preparing for 30,000–50,000 refugees expected 
to become eligible to enter universities between 2016–2020, 
according to the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD).
In 2015 the refugee influx reached a peak in Germany, 
setting off what the German and global media soon began 
referring to a “refugee crisis”3 when as many as 890,000 refu-
gees in 2015 and another 280,000 in 2016 sought asylum in 
the country, known for its generous social system and liberal 
immigration policies.4
The influx of the large numbers of refugees arriving 
in Germany at the time carried with it a sense of urgency 
that verged on panic.5 This was fuelled mostly by an over-
whelmed bureaucratic system that was struggling to process 
and house the large numbers of people arriving at the bor-
ders daily.6 Even after the initial influx was stemmed and 
German bureaucracy re-stabilized, however, the 2015–16 
period continues to have ramifications on current policy 
and a new right-wing party in parliament, even if factually 
the country had weathered greater disruptions in its postwar 
history, including previously larger refugee streams. This 
contextual reality laid the groundwork for our study of Ger-
many’s response to the “refugee crisis,” and in particular how 
its higher education sector responded. 
Of the new refugees coming into the country in 2015–16, 
76.2 per cent were males between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-five.7 At first Germany could only cope with process-
ing and sheltering new arrivals, but over time it also began 
to direct them into retraining and educational and profes-
sional pathways. Between 30,000 and 50,000 refugees were 
projected at the time to become eligible to begin or resume 
their interrupted university studies in Germany within the 
next one or two years when their credentialing and qualifica-
tion hurdles would be resolved.8 Applying as an organizing 
principle Robertson and Dale’s9 Critical Cultural Political 
Economy of Education, this article analyzes how the social, 
political, and economic realities of education affected Ger-
many’s universities and the ways they responded in the first 
years of this newest refugee challenge for Germany, how they 
began to adapt their programming on the basis of their expe-
rience with the first refugee cohorts, and what challenges 
they foresaw for integrating refugees into higher education.
An Ambivalent Land of Migration
Since World War II Germany has gradually transitioned into 
being regarded as a so-called land of migration, although 
with contested public support.10 This transition began 
immediately after the Second World War, when Germany 
absorbed between 12 and 14 million expelled ethnic Ger-
mans who were being driven out of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and the Soviet Union.11 In subsequent years, large num-
bers of foreigners arrived through so-called guest worker 
programs of the 1960s.12 when as the result of accelerating 
economic recovery in the late 1940s through the 1950s and 
1960s and attendant labour shortages, roughly 14 million 
guest workers arrived through bilateral recruitment agree-
ments established with Turkey as well as several European 
and North African countries. Of these, roughly 3 million 
eventually stayed in the country.13 More recently in the 
1990s, increasing migration streams followed, particularly 
in the mid-1990s during the Balkan War, when 1.504 mil-
lion applied for asylum status in Germany.14 Gradually, the 
federal republic became a major target for migration flows 
among industrialized countries.15 Despite the inflow, there 
had been no laws in Germany that dealt with the issue of 
immigration, and the public was slow to accept Germany’s 
new status as a country of migration.16 The first national Law 
on Immigration and Migrant Integration (Zuwanderungsge-
setz) came into effect only in 2005, which was late when com-
pared with other migration countries.17 Thus, while 2015 saw 
heavier records of asylum applications than in years past, the 
events that unfolded in 2015–16 were not an unprecedented 
migration rush, and previous periods witnessed even larger 
refugee streams.18
What marked the 2015–16 “crisis” as different from pre-
vious mass migration events into Germany was the initial 
welcome refugees received. Vivid images in the media heark-
ened back to another recent moment in modern German 
history, when West Germans welcomed East Germans after 
the Berlin Wall opened in 1989. But this did not last long. 
While the generous reception refugees received in 2015 and 
early 2016 was characterized by a supportive media herald-
ing the Willkommenskultur, when their numbers continued 
to increase, the media’s language turned to “compassion 
fatigue”19 and not long thereafter a “refugee tsunami.”20 With 
a rate in 2015 of granting 49.8 per cent constitutional asylum, 
refugee status, or another type of protective status—and 90 
per cent if economic migrants from the Balkan states were 
discounted—the debate around the integration of refugees 
took on particular urgency.21
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Background on the German Higher Education 
Context
Responses to Massification: Standardization vs. Addressing 
Individual Needs
Germany has a well-established, tuition-free higher educa-
tion system with 429 institutions, from research universities 
to universities of applied sciences. Education decisions lie at 
the state level within the federal system, giving them substan-
tial autonomy. This status has allowed for the development of 
a diverse higher education system, although, as in any sys-
tem, geographic and other contextual factors have also led to 
significant differentiation among university profiles. 
Along with being a magnet for refugees, Germany in 
2015–16 was also the fifth most popular destination for 
international students and indisputably a key player in the 
competitive international education marketplace.22 In 2016, 
357,835 international students (12.76 per cent of the student 
body) were enrolled at German universities,23 attracted by 
its generally high quality and well-resourced, tuition-free 
system. The combination of international students cou-
pled with the persistent growth in domestic students led 
to a 44.5 per cent increase of the total student body since 
2007–8.24 Universities reacted to this increase by limiting 
students’ choice within study programs, which is consistent 
with reforms introduced throughout the European Higher 
Education Area via the broader Bologna Process. This policy 
resulted in greater numbers of students crowding into semi-
nars and lectures and greater student-professor ratios (from 
1:59 in 2004 to 1:66 in 2014), as well as fewer contact hours, 
more online lectures, and fewer student services, among 
other cost- and personnel-reduction measures.25
While the 30,000–50,000 refugees estimated to seek 
access to higher education within the following years would 
amount to an increase of only 1–2 per cent among the total 
university student body of 2,803,916 at the time,26 refugee 
students would also need new and additional support and 
services to succeed. That difference marked a stark contrast 
to the coping strategies universities had applied over the pre-
vious years to deal with the more incremental growth in stu-
dent enrolments. Services needed by refugees were extensive, 
from verification of higher education entrance requirements 
to language preparatory classes, from buddy and mentoring 
programs to additional guidance and individual consulta-
tions. All of these also required additional staff and financial 
and material resources.27 These needs continue to place 
significant new demands on the capacities of universities to 
adequately serve their students. 
Access to Higher Education 
Despite a reputation for bureaucracy, German university 
entrance requirements for refugees are no more onerous 
than quality control mechanisms imposed by most other 
higher education systems in Europe or North America. Ger-
man employers and institutions rigorously review diplomas, 
transcripts, and certificates of authenticity of any applicants 
for education or employment. While early cohorts of refu-
gees were still able to flee with their documents in hand or 
had uploaded them onto online storage clouds, some later 
cohorts who fled more quickly under rapidly deteriorating 
conditions arrived without documentation. To meet these 
challenges, the Standing Conference of the Ministers of 
Education and Cultural Affairs (KmK) eased their burden 
in December 2015 by implementing through statute the fol-
lowing three entrance stages for refugees unable to provide 
proof of credentials from their home countries.28
1. Hochschulzugangsberechtigung, HZB (university entrance 
qualification) 
The HZB is a valid university entrance qualification that can 
be verified against the Anabin database (Recognition and 
assessment of foreign qualifications) and then processed by 
universities with the help of a credential service provider. 
The Anabin database can compare school leaving certificates, 
training certificates, individual achievement reports, and 
other documents to a vast collection of original documents 
from 180 countries and 25,000 higher education institutions. 
For example, a Syrian student who earned a 70 per cent 
or above on his or her high school leaving examination in 
Syria would be granted direct access to higher education in 
Germany if the Anabin database proves the veracity of those 
credentials.
2. Verification of scholastic aptitude with TestAS
TestAS is a standardized scholastic aptitude test to measure 
students’ intellectual abilities. While the test can be taken in 
either German or English and is free of charge for the first 
sitting, in our research we learned that some universities, 
such as the University of Cologne and the Goethe Univer-
sity Frankfurt, also provided the test in Arabic.29 Although 
TestAS is neither a language competency exam nor a test of 
subject-specific knowledge, it is an important measure of 
an applicant’s general intellectual competencies to study at 
a German university or technical institution. Subject-level 
testing must still be conducted by an individual department 
once a university has determined an applicant is sufficiently 
qualified, however.30
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3. Verification of required language proficiency
While C1 German-language proficiency is required to study 
for a BA or MA taught in German, by 2015–16 approximately 
150 BA and MA programs were on offer throughout Germany 
in English, according to the German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD).31 However, even for fully English-taught 
programs, certain universities in our study, such as the Uni-
versity of Duisburg-Essen, require at least a B2 German-lan-
guage proficiency. Even so, while the dominant language of 
instruction at German universities remains German, there 
has also been a clear trend over the past decade toward more 
English-language programs. As an example of this trend, 
which at its core is meant to assertively attract international 
students, both the Technische Universität Darmstadt and 
the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf in our sample 
offered five English MA programs, including Physics and 
European Studies.
Financing Education Studies
As of 2015–16, public universities in Germany were all free of 
charge, apart from an administrative fee of €150–€350 cus-
tomarily charged per term, which also includes a regional 
travel card. A monthly grant-loan combination (BaföG) 
provides a living allowance, which depends on a student’s 
personal assets, earnings, and parental income but can-
not exceed €735. There has been no change in the funding 
mechanisms for all students, including refugee applicants. 
The policy continues to be that half the sum is granted as 
an interest-free loan for which repayment begins after the 
fifth year following graduation; the rate is based on monthly 
salary income and can be forgiven if a set salary threshold 
is not met.32 Additional loans with interest rates below 1 per 
cent are available to students from the government-owned 
development bank, KFW. Refugees have the same access to 
these generous German educational support mechanisms as 
do all domestic students, are neither given special favours 
nor disadvantaged in this regard.33 
Theoretical Framework
In looking at the German higher education response to the 
current refugee influx as a macrosocial challenge, we apply 
Connie Gersick’s Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm34 and 
Susan Robertson and Roger Dale’s Critical Cultural Political 
Economy of Education (CCPEE) framework.35 We see both as 
helpful organizing principles. 
We utilize the Robertson and Dale framework to organize 
our discussion, as their use of cultural, political, and eco-
nomic lenses provides a helpful gestalt on which to structure 
our own discussion. We see the German higher education 
(HE) response to the 2015–16 “refugee crisis” as embodying 
larger globalizing processes and structures. Robertson and 
Dale’s CCPEE framework insightfully helps to analyze the 
broader context that influences and conditions German HE 
policy and institutional responses to refugee integration and 
access to higher education. Their framework emphasizes 
the critical interrogation of what they call the “education 
ensemble” as it interacts with and emerges from the cultural, 
political, and economic processes that are embedded within 
globalization. The use of the concept of “education ensemble” 
does not simply reduce education to being an agent of social-
ization or allow it to be merely measured through learning 
outcomes; it acknowledges that education is deeply embed-
ded in often highly contested, multiple societal relationships 
through the very actors, institutions, and structures that 
operate within it.36 It is in this context that we analyze the 
way emerging and existing juxtapositions between cultural, 
political, and economic forces shaped the response, both 
broadly in Germany and also through the actions taken by 
its universities, as they prepared to accommodate this new 
group of incoming students. 
In looking at the university sector and how cultural, polit-
ical, and economic forces challenged the refugee integration 
programming they were beginning to organize at the time, 
we also find particular resonance in Gersick’s Punctuated 
Equilibrium Paradigm.37 This paradigm describes organiza-
tions as characterized by “relatively long periods of stability 
(equilibrium), punctuated by compact periods of qualitative, 
metamorphic change (revolution).”38 This model provides 
an appropriate lens to look at the German university land-
scape in its assumption that, along with continuous adap-
tation efforts, major changes also suddenly occur at times. 
Ideally universities are responsive, but it may be in how 
they react that sheds the brightest light on their openness to 
reform and adaptation. This puncturing of otherwise general 
equilibrium in the German higher education system is what 
makes the case of the refugee influx into the country and its 
university sector so intriguing. Even though German uni-
versities had been reforming incrementally during previous 
decades in response to the Bologna Declaration,39 the unex-
pected influx of refugees in 2015–16 presented them with a 
new opportunity to more urgently consider targeted reforms.
The Study
The rush to cope with the regulatory demands of process-
ing so many new arrivals allowed relatively little time to 
reflect on the effectiveness and impact of the process. Early 
on, accounts of the sudden influx of refugees and limited 
analysis came primarily from the media, German educa-
tion and migration ministries, and a handful of policy and 
philanthropic organizations that were conducting primarily 
demographic studies. Mostly missing were more careful and 
deeper academic analyses on specific aspects of a critical 
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period in Germany’s recent history as it was unfolding in the 
early days of the influx in 2015–16. 
Only more recently have publications in German-lan-
guage academic journals40 and research reports by German 
ministries (e.g., Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung41) 
and university research groups (e.g., Kleist42) begun to 
examine the legal and practical boundaries that have faced 
refugees trying to access German higher education. Inter-
national journals only more recently have begun to publish 
research on the German case, and theses and doctoral stud-
ies have also begun to emerge (e.g., Ragab et al.43). Given the 
fact that the education sector is a critical player in refugee 
resettlement in offering a primary conduit back into society 
and acting as a powerful antidote to the trauma of forced 
migration,44 documenting this process is important, and 
understanding what happened early on in the German case 
is critical for historical and policy studies that are still to be 
written. 
This article contributes to this important area of scholar-
ship by detailing the situation in Germany and how various 
sectors and key players reacted in 2015–16. The German 
higher education system provides an ideal setting to study 
the refugee response and to look initially at the early suc-
cess and failures of its universities to integrate this poten-
tially significant new workforce. How the process played out 
early on, and will continue to evolve, will have significant 
short- and long-term ramifications in a country in which the 
immigrant influx has been discussed as a possible solution to 
the demographic challenges facing the country after decades 
of a declining birth rate and an aging population.45
The goal of this study was to investigate how German 
universities sought to help newly arrived refugees primarily 
from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but also in lesser num-
bers from Africa (e.g., Eritrea), Central and Eastern Europe, 
and other countries and regions, integrate into the German 
higher education system by creating academic program-
ming and support services. We did this by looking primarily 
at how the migration dynamic in Germany played out in 
cultural, political, and economic terms as reported in the 
daily and weekly newspapers and magazines spanning the 
political spectrum, through grey literature published by 
higher federal authorities at the time, independently com-
missioned research projects that had just been published, 
and individual academic researchers publishing in English 
and in German at the time. Since then much more research 
has begun to emerge, but our focus is on the earliest studies 
that came out in the initial crisis period. 
In addition to the literature review, we also sent out an 
email survey in the autumn and winter of 2016 to a selection 
of seventeen universities46 throughout Germany (receiving 
fifteen responses) to query them about their current and 
planned activities in the coming years. Our sample covered 
institutions in the former East and West and also those 
in larger metropolitan centres like Berlin, Hamburg, and 
Munich, and smaller cities like Dortmund and Darmstadt. 
The sample included responses from a range of adminis-
trators at each university, from directors of international 
offices, to those leading smaller teams of personnel who 
were working directly with refugee students. Our email 
included an explanation of our interest in analyzing in detail 
how German universities  were dealing  with the “refugee 
crisis,” and also understanding  how Germany was manag-
ing the latest migration challenge at a time when the political 
moods in both Europe and the United States appeared to be 
increasingly isolationist and anti-migrant.  Our questions 
asked respondents to explain the current number of refu-
gees, requirements for  enrolment, services and programs 
provided, and anticipated enrolments in coming years. 
In seeking to triangulate our comprehensive literature 
review and survey of institutions, we also looked at smaller 
recent studies. For example, our research was inspired in 
particular by a smaller, previous study conducted by Hannes 
Schammann and Christin Younso,47 who had looked at the 
activities of seven universities in the winter semester between 
October 2015 and April 2016. We selected our universities on 
the following criteria: (1) geographic location representing 
diverse parts of the country, particularly the former East and 
West, (2) likelihood of having a large concentration of refu-
gees, which encompasses both major metropolitan centres 
and smaller affected cities, and (3) level of engagement with 
refugees. 
Our analysis of the fifteen universities was not intended 
as our sole data source but rather to further shed light on 
the “refugee crisis” as reported by the wide range of sources 
noted above. Finally, we also sought email feedback from the 
German Academic Exchange Service, which was facilitating 
educational integration of refugees in Germany’s sixteen 
federal states. We believe the DAAD’s response, along with 
the responses from our fifteen participating universities, 
helps to demonstrate the passion and dedication shown by 
the higher education sector at the time to addressing refugee 
integration challenges. Although the profiled universities 
represented only a small slice of Germany’s more than 400 
institutions of higher education, these data, in combination 
with the DAAD information and our literature review, pro-
vide a robust summary of the diverse range of universities 
and other key players who initiated services in 2015–16 to 
begin helping Germany’s newest arrivals.
Findings
From the research we found emerging fault lines in soci-
ety as a reflection, or catalyst, of the “refugee crisis.” In the 
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following section we use the CCPEE framework as an organi-
zational tool to structure our findings in the three over-
arching categories (cultural, political, economic) with the 
corresponding subcategories (for example, for the category 
“cultural,” we discuss universities as a civil society player 
addressing the “refugee crisis”). We look at these fault lines 
within the cultural, political, and economic factors and how 
education has influenced these three fields at play, by look-
ing specifically at higher education institutions and how they 
have interacted within the three dimensions.
Emerging Fault Lines 
In 2015–16 Germany’s response to the entry of a large num-
ber of refugees into the Federal Republic of Germany was 
increasingly complicated and influenced by the struggle 
between two extreme poles: the perception of the nation cel-
ebrating a Willkommenskultur and a bitter backlash develop-
ing against refugees.48 As the German newspaper Die Zeit 
expressed in a 2015 editorial, “Two bitterly inimical mind 
sets are now working against each other here in Germany 
and in Europe: We are opening our arms because people 
are coming (Merkel) vs. Because we are opening our arms, 
people are coming.”49 The social debate was being fought 
between two plainly irreconcilable positions: rejection, 
which might become violent, on the one hand, and a wel-
coming culture, which was based on active civil engagement, 
on the other. These opposing positions were also evident in 
Angela Merkel’s statement, “Wir schaffen das” (We will man-
age it) on the one hand,50 and the extra-parliamentary oppo-
sition’s characterization of refugee supporters as Ideologisch 
verblendete Gutmenschen (ideologically blinded do-gooders) 
on the other hand.51
Juxtapositions Challenging Germany
The mass stream of refugees entering Germany in 2015 cre-
ated a context influenced by juxtapositions of cultural, politi-
cal, and economic factors. Without intending to artificially 
separate these dimensions, we discuss each separately for the 
sake of clarity in the sections that follow. The discussion is 
built around our broad review of the literature at the time 
and supported with examples from our fifteen case study 
universities. In doing so, we analyze how the higher educa-
tion sector in particular has been affected by sharp conflicts 
between, on the one hand, an active civil society that was 
committed to providing crucial refugee support, and, on the 
other hand, the heightened nativist fears of a Germany over-
run with refugees that began to gain strength. 
While policy and governance activities traditionally have 
occurred in spheres separate from the everyday working 
lives of ordinary citizens, the “refugee crisis” brought out an 
extraordinarily engaged civil society. This civic engagement 
played itself out in positive ways through volunteerism 
and the donation of material goods to help refugees, and 
in negative ways through public protests and new political 
movements that agitated against refugees. The “refugee crisis” 
catalyzed actions by different pockets of society and mobi-
lized people of diverse backgrounds and persuasions who 
previously had not been as publicly willing to voice their 
sentiments. In the following section we address the compo-
nents of what we saw as emerging fault lines that Germany 
will need to deal with in the coming years as the refugee 
integration question continues to evolve.
Cultural Factors
The Positive Face of Civil Society
Images broadcast around the world of cheering crowds wel-
coming refugees at Munich’s central station in the summer 
of 2015 “seemed to shake off [Germany’s] image as a cold-
hearted nation.”52 According to a 2016 study by the Migra-
tion Policy Institute (MPI), in Germany there was outspoken 
support from the elites—comprising media, industry repre-
sentatives, and trade associations, among others—for immi-
gration prior to 2016, compared with more negative views in 
other European countries such as Spain, Italy, or the United 
Kingdom.53 While basic supplies and housing were provided 
by the authorities, many workaday Germans also generously 
provided a broad range of additional services, from toys 
and clothing to ad hoc language classes and helping refu-
gees navigate Germany’s dense bureaucracy.54 This public 
outpouring of support—much heralded by the media at 
the time—helped to quickly mobilize civic engagement and 
contribute to supporting the bureaucratic system. For exam-
ple, 120,000 volunteers from the German Protestant Church 
and 100,000 volunteers from the German Catholic Church, 
along with other faiths and secular organizations, and a wide 
range of organically formed smaller, ad hoc support groups 
quickly sprang into action to offer language classes, reading 
literacy courses, and assistance with government agencies 
and doctor’s visits. These support services were likened to 
being tantamount to a “life insurance of the [German] state.”55 
But this kind of volunteerism, while ramped up in response 
to the moment, was not entirely unprecedented. According 
to a study by the Berlin Institute for Empirical Research on 
Integration and Migration (BIM), the number of volunteers 
engaging in refugee work had already increased by 70 per 
cent over the past several years.56 This level of civil society 
engagement became a critical bridge between overstretched 
authorities and refugees.57 Even so, a study conducted by the 
Bertelsmann Foundation at the time also revealed that over 
the last two years the feeling of Germans that their state’s 
generosity was being stretched to the limit also grew from 40 
per cent in 2015 to 54 per cent two years later.58 
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Public Backlash
In order to make sense of the outpouring of student interest 
in helping refugees, it is important to make clear what was 
happening outside the proverbial gates of the university and 
in the streets, where refugee presence may have felt more 
overwhelming to the greater population of Germans. Thus, as 
refugee numbers steadily increased throughout 2015, the ini-
tial welcome culture also began to be tempered by more stark 
reality. With the spike of refugees entering in the autumn of 
that year—280,000 in September alone —the media coverage 
became more nuanced and also began to include reporting 
on the strain that refugees were starting to place on overbur-
dened administrative agencies. By this time, however, the 
media’s initial euphoric coverage had caused it to lose credi-
bility among certain segments of the population, who went so 
far as to revive even the Nazi-era term “lying press” or Lügen-
presse.59 On top of that, some segments of the population who 
had not previously engaged in public protest began to express 
their distress at the influx of refugees and joined large protests 
pressuring Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union 
party (CDU) to abandon its open-border position. 
The most unsavoury face of this pressure came through 
demonstrations by the Patriotic Europeans against the Islami-
zation of the West, or Pegida, movement,60 a group most 
active in Eastern Germany and whose ranks seemed to wax 
and wane in tandem with events involving refugees.61 Attacks 
on refugee accommodations also quintupled from 199 in 2014 
to 1,005 in 2015. Perhaps most worrisome, two-thirds of the 
attackers had never been criminally active before or involved 
with crimes linked to right-wing tendencies.62 At regional 
elections, some Pegida supporters transitioned their protest 
voice to the voting booth in support of the newly emerged 
populist-nationalist party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), 
which made gains in state parliamentary elections and in the 
national elections by September of 2017, making it the third-
largest party in the German parliament.63 The requisitioning 
of gymnasiums and other public facilities as temporary refu-
gee shelters further complicated public attitudes toward refu-
gees, although they have all now been returned to their usual 
use. The event that most badly damaged the welcome culture 
occurred in Cologne during New Year’s Eve 2016 when “mobs 
of ‘North African and Middle Eastern men’ sexually assaulted 
hundreds of women in the fireworks chaos.”64 Even though 
a subsequent investigation found only three of the fifty-eight 
men to be recent asylum seekers, the damage to the refugee 
narrative had already been done.
Universities as Civil Society Players: “Third Mission” 
Universities throughout the country had the autonomy to 
respond as they chose to and were generally compelled by 
factors related to their proximity to refugee streams, available 
funding, and pressure from students and concerned citizens. 
As a sector they became engaged through strengthening exist-
ing services or creating new ones, much in tandem with the 
civil society movement outside their walls. As of 2016, 170 uni-
versities were receiving DAAD “Integra” (Integrating Refugees 
in Degree Programs) funding to develop their own program-
ming to advance the integration of more than 6,800 refugee 
students into higher education.65 Much of this programming 
was driven by an active show of solidarity by faculty, staff, and 
students interested in helping refugees, acting as a beacon of 
hope to combat increasing demonstrations against refugees. 
They did so by going beyond the traditional functions of 
research and teaching, and allowing refugees to audit courses, 
take language classes (sometimes even student-led for refu-
gees indifferent to their scholastic aptitude), receive counsel-
ling, and participate in sports and social events. This level of 
service is generally referred to as a university’s “third mission,” 
a term used by many university websites and the Federal Min-
istry for Education and Research’s materials.66
However, although well-meaning and beneficial, some of 
these university support services—for example, permitting 
the auditing of courses—also created two potential scenarios 
that set up unrealistic expectations for some refugee students: 
on the one hand, it gave the erroneous impression that they 
were already officially enrolled, and on the other it gave stu-
dents who would be unable to meet enrolment requirements 
false hope that they would eventually be accepted into the 
university as regularly enrolled students. To their credit, as 
early as winter semester 2015–16, many universities appeared 
to realize this and began transitioning support services from 
embracing all refugees as a homogenous group with equal 
chances, to instead focusing primarily on helping those who 
were likely to have the necessary credentials to eventually 
succeed in enrolling.67
Political Factors
The Merkel administration’s efforts to address the refugee situ-
ation have been characterized by a “we will manage it” ethos 
in public messaging, and behind-the-scenes machinations to 
devise new regulations to control the tide of incoming refu-
gees. As refugee numbers increased throughout 2015 and local 
governments began to work in crisis mode to provide services 
and accommodations before winter, Merkel faced growing 
criticism that she had invited the refugees in without suffi-
cient forethought about what to do once they arrived.68
In early 2016, as the AfD party gained support and five state 
elections loomed between March and September,69 Merkel 
not only needed to tighten asylum laws but also to devise a 
solution to the “refugee crisis” without having to concede to 
political failure. After the Balkan countries closed their bor-
ders, ending the main refugee route to Northern Europe, the 
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chancellor’s strategy changed to officially still welcoming the 
perceived “deserving or real refugees”70 but also making it 
nearly impossible for them to reach Europe in the first place. 
While still seen by Syrian refugees as the “compassionate 
mother,”71 Merkel was also working out a deal with Turk-
ish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan,72 effective by March 
2016, that restrained refugees from continuing their flight 
into Europe.73 In this way, Merkel was able to maintain the 
illusion of welcoming refugees while simultaneously making 
deals to restrain them from reaching European shores.74
Both the European Union and Germany have attempted to 
limit further numbers of refugees from entering the EU. At the 
same time, state-led integration initiatives have provided sup-
port to help integrate refugees who are already in the country 
into society and the workforce. The education sector has been 
a critical player in this effort. The following sections examine 
the higher education sector’s programming to meet that goal. 
Language and Entrance to the University 
Integration classes (Integrationskurse) aim to provide immi-
grants with knowledge of German history, culture, and 
social norms.75 A new law stipulates that refugees who wish 
to seek any kind of residency status must take this course, or 
their social benefits can be reduced. Yet, according to figures 
from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, as of January to 
August 2016, only half—171,000 out of 366,000—who were 
issued with a voucher by the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees were able to access an integration and lan-
guage class. They also seek to bring all immigrants up to 
B1 language competency level, which the EU defines as the 
ability to engage with a language on an everyday basis on 
familiar topics regularly encountered in school, work, and 
leisure, and understand and formulate simply connected 
texts.76 However, integration classes end at the B1 level, 
which is not sufficient for study at university level. Therefore, 
C1 level German-language proficiency is required for univer-
sity study, and all students must cross that hurdle before they 
can regularly matriculate as enrolled students within the 
German university system. 
During the 2015–16 “refugee crisis,” universities stepped in 
to help bridge that language gap, picking up refugees once they 
mastered the B1 language exam and helping them to progress 
to C1 proficiency. Between 2015 and 2019 the DAAD provided 
universities with €100 million in competitive grants to develop 
support programming over the next several years. In 2016 
alone the DAAD made €27 million available to German univer-
sities through its “Integra” program to apply for grants funding 
to support the development of programming for refugees.77 
With DAAD support and additional state and private foun-
dation funding,78 most German universities by 2016 were 
providing language preparatory courses. The distribution of 
refugees across the academic sector and the means of sup-
porting them, however, varied greatly. For example, accord-
ing to our study of fifteen universities, the number of refugee 
students taking language courses ranged between 675 at the 
University of Hamburg, roughly 200 at the Technical Uni-
versity of Darmstadt, to just 20 at the University of Stuttgart, 
similar in size to TU Darmstadt. 
These language and preparatory classes for refugees, 
however, are not equivalent to those subject-matter classes 
taken by matriculated students, and rather served merely 
as a stepping-stone to full enrolment once credentialing 
was verified and a department recognized a candidate’s 
subject-specific competency. While the vast majority of uni-
versities required a minimum of B1 language proficiency to 
allow refugees into their language and preparatory classes, 
there were exceptions in both directions. For example, the 
Goethe University of Frankfurt required only an A2 level 
language proficiency—defined as the ability to “understand 
sentences and frequently use expressions related to areas of 
most immediate relevance”79—while the Heinrich Heine 
University (HHU) of Düsseldorf required a B2 level. The 
HHU provided Deutsch-Intensivkurse for twenty students to 
prepare them within one year to fully access German higher 
education. While most universities offered the language 
preparatory classes on campus, some universities, including 
the Technical University of Dortmund, used an off-campus 
service partner. The University of Duisburg-Essen collabo-
rated with a private external language school but started to 
provide its own language preparatory classes in 2017.
Along with language courses, most of the universities in 
our study also provided special integration programs cus-
tomized to the specific needs and requirements of refugees. 
However, the size of the general student body at these insti-
tutions was not a reliable indicator of the number of places 
available to refugees or the depth of programming that was 
being created for them. For example, in the 2015–16 win-
ter semester, the Heinrich Heine University of Düsseldorf 
enrolled 33,000 students, but only 20 refugees, while the 
University of Hamburg enrolled 42,000 students but had 539 
refugees. Yet each of these large universities offered substan-
tial programming. In that regard, size did not appear to be an 
accurate indicator of the depth of programming. 
In most cases the services for refugees offered by universi-
ties included some degree of the following: the opportunity 
for refugees who are not yet fully enrolled to participate in 
teaching events and lectures, but not for academic credit; 
regular informational events and campus and library tours 
to inform refugees about facilities and academic information; 
crash courses on subjects such as mathematics or additional 
online language courses to help prepare refugees to take entry 
examinations; buddy programs in which a domestic student 
Volume 34 Refuge Number 2
46
helps a refugee with events, activities, and lectures and even 
language issues (many universities give students credit points 
for voluntarily working with refugee students); regular 
gatherings where students, particularly women, can discuss 
traumatic experiences in confidence; and intercultural work-
shops with external coaches to discuss social issues of mutual 
understanding, acculturation, and society. In one particularly 
exciting program, refugee students were working on an app to 
make museums accessible for non-German speakers.
Data and Forecast
While the DAAD in 2016 predicted that 30,000–50,000 refu-
gee students would become eligible to enrol in Germany’s 
universities within the next two years, most of our case study 
universities were unable to estimate at the time how many 
students they expected. That assessment was borne out of a 
wider chronic problem: while universities register the stu-
dents’ country of origin, Germany’s strict data privacy laws 
(Datenschutz) prohibit them from gathering additional data. 
Therefore most universities had little knowledge of their 
actual numbers of fully matriculated refugee students 
because these figures are not recorded as part of general 
student demographics. Self-reported data can therefore be 
noted but are only anecdotal, locally available, and not fed 
into a national databank. Among our case study universities, 
self-disclosed data showed the following: At the University 
of Hamburg, seventy-two refugees applied for full enrolment 
but only nineteen were accepted; at the Humboldt Univer-
sity in Berlin, which created a special MA track for refugees, 
only eleven were enrolled by 2016; at Ludwig Maximilian 
University of Munich, fifteen refugee students passed the 
preparatory courses and became regularly matriculated stu-
dents; at the Technical University of Munich, eight students 
who formerly audited courses became enrolled; and at the 
Free University of Berlin, the International Office admit-
ted twenty-one refugees for full enrolment, and sixteen of 
them matriculated. However, passing the preparatory course 
exams did not (nor does it now) bypass the regular appli-
cation procedure, which requires refugee students, along 
with all international students, to compete as international 
applicants. Still, because official data tracking is prohibited, 
it is unknown how many refugee students were simply not 
being recorded once they became mainstreamed as regular 
enrolees. For understandable reasons, once refugee students 
are fully matriculated, they may also be reluctant to continue 
to be tracked and identified as refugees in order to distance 
themselves from a label that could stigmatize them.80 
Economic Factors
Early in 2015 Germany’s top thirty DAX-listed corporations 
were celebrated for their public statements welcoming 
refugees. In November 2015 these companies pledged, in an 
expensive print advertising campaign, to hire refugees and 
provide structured apprenticeship programs, even for those 
lacking the necessary qualifications. However, as of the mid-
dle of 2016, few of these grand promises had led to refugee 
employment. Although these companies referred to 500,000 
vacancies they wanted to fill, as of the summer of 2016, only 
fifty-four refugees had received open-ended contracts from 
any of Germany’s top thirty corporations, and fifty of those 
contracts were all with the postal service, the Deutsche Post. 
Companies cited a lack of German-language skills as the 
reason but then failed to offer an internal pathway for any 
on-the-job training.81
Essentially, most of the top thirty DAX-listed companies 
refused to put their money where their mouth was. While the 
leadership of the Deutsche Bank claimed in November 2015 
that the influx of refugees was “the best that could happen 
to Germany,”82 by July 2016 still not a single major bank or 
insurance company had created any jobs, vocational training 
spots, or internships for refugees.83 While the federal minis-
ter of labour and social affairs, Andrea Nahles, had initially 
referred to refugees as a “labour force of tomorrow,” she later 
referred to them as one for “the day after tomorrow.”84
While available spots in Germany’s top companies 
were few and far between for refugees because of a lack of 
immediately qualified applicants, Germany’s Mittelstand of 
smaller, often family-run companies—historically touted as 
the backbone of Germany’s economic success—appeared to 
be more receptive. In a study by the Bertelsmann Founda-
tion, self-reported data from 600 Mittelstand companies 
employing more than 250 employees indicated that 62 per 
cent provided internships for asylum seekers, 48 per cent 
provided vocational training spots for young refugees, and 
47 per cent provided regular workplaces for migrants.85 It is 
notable that in 2016 Germany’s well-established vocational 
training system appeared to be providing the most realistic 
pathway to employment for refugees. 
According to a November 2016 report from the Federal 
Employment Agency,86 there were 546,900 available voca-
tional training spots in 2015–16, offering more options 
for refugees than universities, which have more rigorous 
entrance criteria. Refugees, therefore, needed to be made 
aware that their choices go beyond an academic education, 
particularly because 2016 was the ninth year running in 
which there were more open vocational training spots than 
applicants available to fill them. 
Many refugees might have been making the errone-
ous assumption that only a university education would be 
respected, as may have been the case in their homelands, and 
not fully realized that in Germany vocational training has 
long been a very effective model for professional success and 
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an attractive alternative to a university education. While can-
didates need some German-language competency as well as 
nine to ten years of schooling to be eligible for a training spot, 
the requirements are not as rigorous as they are for a univer-
sity degree. While vocational education in Germany includes 
classroom training at a vocational college and hands-on train-
ing at a workplace, the classroom training is not equivalent to 
university work. Even so, despite its promise, the vocational 
education track is also not an automatic solution for all refu-
gees who are unable to enter or remain at the university. In 
2016, of the 10,300 refugees who applied for a vocational train-
ing spot, a mere 3,600 were selected,87 and in 2015, up to 70 
per cent of refugees ended up aborting their training, accord-
ing to the Chamber of Crafts and Trades of Bavaria.88
Our queries of fifteen universities in Germany indicated 
that the counselling and services offered to refugees were 
focused on informing them about different tracks within 
higher education, and assuming that aspiring students 
already knew about the other options available to them. 
Instead of merely rejecting refugees who lack the necessary 
credentials, universities must help productively redirect ref-
ugees into other viable pathways, such as vocational training. 
Policy Recommendations for Universities
Collaborative Counselling with Other Sectors
If universities seek to fulfill their third mission as credible 
civil society actors, they will need to provide counselling to 
help successfully divert those who are not eligible for full 
university entrance to find an occupation that matches their 
competencies. To that end, we suggest that universities team 
up with relevant partners in the region such as the Jobcentre, 
the Chamber of Commerce, and the private sector. The Job-
centre helps refugees map out an alternative pathway within 
Germany’s well-established dual system of vocational educa-
tion and training.
Make Sure Policies Work 
As a result of Germany’s aforementioned strict data privacy 
laws, reliable data on how many refugees are fully enrolled 
in universities are not available, although such data could 
easily be collected. Our study found that because of these 
Datenschutz privacy protection barriers, universities were 
not tracking the pathways of asylum seekers once they 
became regularly enrolled. To investigate the implications, 
we contacted the DAAD directly to ask why, on a national 
level, refugees were not being tracked once they became 
officially enrolled, even though the DAAD and BMBF had 
pledged to invest €100 million through its Integra program 
in higher education for refugees over the next several years. 
The agency responded that it has a comprehensive moni-
toring system in place and is remedying the lack of data by 
collaborating with an unnamed research institute to trace 
the future impact of their policies. In our view it seems 
imprudent, in light of the urgency of the “refugee crisis,” to 
delay transparent data tracking through this arrangement 
when a quicker resolution would likely help refugees avoid 
the chronically high dropout rates that have plagued earlier 
groups of at-risk students.89
Conduct More Comprehensive Analysis
We argue that universities should register the “flight” status 
of refugee students in a national or state-level database so 
they can empirically monitor the impact and success of their 
programming for refugees and thereby justify the consider-
able effort and significant costs related to refugee integra-
tion. Budget flows should be clearly measured, and program 
impacts need to be systematically analyzed. As of 2017, this 
information still appeared to be mostly anecdotal or at best 
internally available in certain universities, such as the Free 
University of Berlin, only when they agreed to share it with 
researchers. However, such data are not centrally available 
for research purposes. This type of transparency is particu-
larly important for assessing refugees’ chances of success in 
German higher education in light of DAAD figures, which 
at the time of our study showed that 59 per cent of Latin 
American and 41 per cent of African students were discon-
tinuing their BA studies in German universities, compared 
with only 28 twenty-eight of German students.90 This alarm-
ingly high attrition rate suggests that universities may not 
be sufficiently addressing problems associated with entrance 
criteria and support services for at-risk students. It seems 
counterproductive to lose track of refugees and the critical 
data necessary to adapt and customize policies, programs, 
and support measures to help them succeed. 
Appropriate Services to Stem the Tide of Dropouts
The enrolments of refugees in higher education expected in 
the coming years present an opportunity for positive change 
that will also help domestic and foreign students. As noted 
previously, universities have reacted to mass enrolments by 
mainstreaming, standardizing, lowering student-professor 
ratios, and reducing contact hours. This has not been a 
positive development for students. If current data protection 
laws were loosened to allow for more robust collection of the 
data needed to assess attrition or success rates, universities 
would be able to immediately implement programs, such as 
academic writing or guidance for self-structured learning 
that could reduce refugee student dropout rates. 
Conclusion
As Clark and Grandi91 have rightfully argued, the time has 
come to “discard the clichéd image of refugees as passive 
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recipients of aid, sitting idly with outstretched hands.” Ele-
ments of the German example show that, with proper sup-
port, refugees can enrich Germany’s culture and economy,30 
but only if they become successfully integrated. The uni-
versity sector, just as primary and secondary schooling and 
vocational training, is a key player in the integration process 
and could eventually reap the fruits of its success. 
Our research looked at how universities, within a tense 
national environment of forces agitating for and also against 
refugees, worked to accommodate refugees and help them 
transition to full participation in German society. To make 
this transition, refugees will first need access to the knowl-
edge, skills, and opportunities that education can provide. 
Our study of fifteen universities, couched within a broader 
look at the media and research discussion that was taking 
place in 2015–16, showed some of their programming and 
examined the broader German context of civil society efforts 
to address the “refugee crisis” and what the impact of cultural, 
political, and economic forces was on the higher education 
sector in particular. 
Both our case study data and our review of the broader 
context showed that German universities were trying to 
respond positively to the “refugee crisis” through a variety 
of innovative programming and individualized support ser-
vices, and doing so within a national atmosphere that was 
rife with tensions. As the period of the “refugee crisis” fades 
and the broader German effort to integrate new refugees 
takes shape, German universities stand to continue serving 
as positive role models of successful refugee integration, if 
they succeed. Returning to Gersick’s paradigm, the refu-
gee influx is indeed a chance for qualitative, metamorphic 
change in Germany’s universities, but only if they seize the 
moment successfully in this renewed period of disequilib-
rium. That challenge is mighty, and Germany must carefully 
balance its heavy history with forward-looking policies that 
have the potential to maximize the great promise we believe 
its newest arrivals can bring. 
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